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I. Introduction
The arena of international sports law is vast and far-reaching,
transcending national borders through the love of sport. But, this
simple love is not enough to prevent international conflicts and
disputes. In 2018, a Belgian Court of Appeals declared that
“enforced arbitration” to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)1
is illegal, as related to a 2015 complaint filed by the Belgian football
club, RFC Seraing, and the investment fund, Doyen Sports, against
the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) over
Third Party Ownership (TPO) rules.2 Specifically, the Belgian
Court of Appeals ruled that the arbitration agreement in FIFA’s
contract with RFC Seraing violated Article 6 of the European
Convention of Human Rights and Article 47 of the European

† J.D. Candidate 2020, University of North Carolina School of Law. Editor in Chief, North
Carolina Journal of International Law.
1 The Court of Arbitration of Sport (CAS) is also referred to as the Tribunal Arbitral
du Sport (TAS), https://www.tas-cas.org/en/index.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/2JD9-CXDP].
2 Cour d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeal] Bruxelles, Aug. 29, 2018, 2016/AR/2048,
Vaja 1227181 (Belg.). Note that the original transcript has yet to be formally published
and was only printed in French. The decision was translated from French to English
through multiple translation resources, but it is not to be interpreted as a formal translation.
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Charter of Fundamental Rights.3 What is most interesting about the
decision was “the examination of validity of the arbitration clause
enshrined in the FIFA Statutes. . . . [which, under Belgian law, was
found] to be too broad to be valid since the scope is not limited to a
‘defined legal relationship’.”4
The institution of interest in this matter is the CAS, an
international arbitral body that hears appeals from international
sports federations.5 While the CAS is recognized internationally as
the arbitral of last resort for global sports,6 parties are required to
formally accept the CAS’s jurisdiction in their respective contracts
according to the statutes or regulations of the governing sportsrelated body.7 Within these contract negotiations between the
players and the federations, there is little bargaining power allocated
to the players,8 forming a relationship built on unequal footing and
ending in rulings subject to little review or oversight.9
The Belgian Court of Appeals ruling questions the legitimacy of

3 James Diamond, Brussels Court Rules “Enforced Arbitration” of CAS is Illegal,
INSIDE
THE
GAMES
(Sept.
9,
2018),
https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1069768/brussels-court-rules-enforcedarbitration-of-cas-is-illegal [https://perma.cc/HA74-RE5R].
4 Despina Mavromati, The Validity of FIFA’s Arbitration Clause and the
Independence of the CAS: A Detailed Review of the RFC Seraing Cases, LAW IN SPORT
(Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.lawinsport.com/content/articles/item/the-validity-of-fifa-sarbitration-clause-and-the-independence-of-the-cas-a-detailed-review-of-the-rfc-seraingcases [https://perma.cc/UMA9-YG37].
5 See Court of Arbitration for Sport, CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION art.
S12 (2017) (Eng.) [hereinafter CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION].
6 See History of the CAS, TRIBUNAL ARBITRAL DU S PORT/COURT OF ARBITRATION
FOR SPORT (TAS/CAS), https://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-information/history-of-thecas.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3TW3-GXZF].
7 See CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION, C1, S12 (2017) (Eng.).
8 See Leonardo Casini, The Making of a Lex Sportiva by the Court of Arbitration
for Sport, in 236 BEITRÄGE ZUM AUSLÄNDISCHEN ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHT UND
V ÖLKERRECHT, INTERNATIONAL J UDICIAL LAWMAKING ON PUBLIC AUTHORITY AND
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 439–40 (Armin von Bogdandy
& Ingo Venzke eds.) (2012).
9 Jennifer R. Bondulick, Rescuing The “Supreme Court” of Sports: Reforming The
Court of Arbitration for Sport Arbitration Member Selection Procedures, 42 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 275, 295–96 (2016) (“The new provisions of the 1994 CAS Code create the
appearance of institutional independence and good governance for CAS. While these steps
gives the appearance of impartiality, there is still debate as to whether CAS masks the
IOC’s influence. . . . Therefore, the scales are still tipped significantly in favor of the
controlling governing bodies and against the individual athletes.”).
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arbitration clauses requiring automatic appeal to the CAS.10
Automatic appeals from large international federations are a
foundational principle of the tribunal, and the international sports
world would be altered dramatically if the CAS’s authority were
seriously questioned. While this ruling is limited in its scope, it
opens the door to discussing the movement of these cases from the
appellate forum chosen by clubs, typically the CAS, to domestic
courts on challenges to their arbitration clauses.11 The Belgian
Court’s analysis of the arbitration clause through “a strict and
objective interpretation of the arbitration clause enshrined in the
FIFA statutes” turns attention to the broad scope of arbitration
clauses;12 these clauses often lack the specificity of a defined legal
relationship and are often the result of unequal bargaining. While
similar challenges have been presented in the past with little
institutional change, this case further shines a light on systemic
issues that risk the integrity of sports and athletes around the world.
Analysis will proceed in seven parts. Part I describes the
structural framework of the CAS and its parent organization, the
International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS). Part II breaks
down the RFC Seraing and FIFA dispute and covers the ICAS’s
response to the Brussels Court of Appeal’s decision. Part III
provides a legal analysis of the jurisdictional issues that may be
impacted by this decision. Part IV presents the foreseeable
implications of this case to the international sports world. Part V
analyzes elements of the CAS that run counter to American legal
tradition and suggests flaws in its organization. Part VI proposes
institutional changes that could strengthen the CAS amidst doubts
of its authority. Part VII concludes the paper with a reflection on
the future of the CAS and why despite its controversial nature, its
presence is vital to the future of international sports.

10 See generally CA Bruxelles, 2016/AR/2048, Vaja 1227181. “Unless it is clear
from the outset that there is no arbitration agreement referring to CAS, the CAS Court
Office shall take all appropriate actions to set the arbitration in motion. It shall
communicate the request to the Respondent, call upon the parties to express themselves on
the law applicable to the merits of the dispute and set time limits for the Respondent to
submit any relevant information about the number and choice of the arbitrator(s) from the
CAS list, as well as to file an answer to the request for arbitration.” CODE OF SPORTSRELATED ARBITRATION, R39 (2017) (Eng.) (referencing the need for an explicit arbitration
clause calling for automatic appeals to the CAS to be agreed upon by both parties).
11 See generally CA Bruxelles, 2016/AR/2048, Vaja 1227181.
12
Mavromati, supra note 4.
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II. Background
Sports law is a unique sector of the legal field that “presents a
mixed nature, in which a regulatory framework based on private
autonomy interacts constantly with public law norms.”13 This area
of law “is highly heterogeneous, and, above all, it is not simply
transnational, but actually ‘global’: it is made of norms enacted not
only by States, but also by central sporting institutions . . . and by
national sporting bodies.”14 The reach of global sport is expansive,
spanning across 508 million people, and comprising more than 3%
of world trade and 3.7% of combined Gross National Product
(GNP) in the European Union.15 The expansive nature of sports
parallels the nature of sports rules that are “genuine[ly]
[characterized as] ‘global law’ because they are applied across the
entire world, they involve both international and domestic levels,
and they directly affect individuals.”16 International sports law thus
presents a multi-dimensional legal field that is distinctive in nature,
with an evolving character that adapts to the constant changes in
sport globally.
Sports do not just transcend national borders, they also operate
in a global arena that directly reaches individuals on a personal
level. Everyone from players and coaches, to spectators and ESPN
viewers, are exposed to sports everyday through many platforms.
Allegiances on teams are formed, loyalties are tested, and
individuals become emotionally and even financially invested in
their team’s success. As a result, we all feel part of a collective that
transcends state and national borders. The CAS aims to centralize
rules that are then instituted by sports federations in their respective
states and nations, enabling this collective to effectively operate on
an international scale.17
Casini, supra note 8, at 440.
Id. at 441.
15 Ian Blackshaw, The Role of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Countering
the Manipulation of Sport, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
MANIPULATION IN SPORT 223, 223 (Markus Breuer & David Forrest eds., 2018) (explaining
the expansive reach of global sport as ultimately comprising 5.4% of the EU labor force
(15 million people)).
16 Casini, supra note 8, at 439.
17 See Frequently Asked Questions, TAS/CAS, https://www.tas-cas.org/en/generalinformation/frequently-asked-questions.html (last visited August 13, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/AEE5-84D7] (“The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) is an institution
independent of any sports organization which provides for services in order to facilitate
13
14
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The CAS is a unique tribunal that is unlike any other
adjudicatory body. It was created in 1983 with a mission to “build
a centralized mechanism of international judicial review in sport,”
namely to introduce a “supreme court for world sport.”18 Calling
for this need was an increasing number of international sports
disputes and the lack of an independent body to handle them “in a
flexible, quick, inexpensive and binding manner.”19 Unfortunately,
the original CAS began as a “sort of judicial branch within the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) with the latter maintaining
political and financial control over the former” and the inability to
truly operate as an independent and insular entity.20 The CAS was
later reformed by the IOC to its modern institution during the 1994
Paris Agreement.21
The modern-day CAS represents a coexistence of different
jurisdictional models resembling a civil court with commercial law
cases, an administrative court when deciding against sports
federation decisions, a constitutional court when resolving conflicts
of the Olympic movement, and a criminal court when handling
doping violations.22 Overlooking the CAS is its governing body,
the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS).23 After
original pushback from international federations and other sporting
arbitration institutions that resisted the formation of a uniform court,
“the CAS defeated its opponents, gained independence and brought
normative harmonization in[to] global sports law.”24
This
“normative harmonization” stemmed from the international sports
world finally having an insular judicial body to provide uniform
rulings.25
the settlement of sports-related disputes through arbitration or mediation by means of
procedural rules adapted to the specific needs of the sports world.”).
18 Casini, supra note 8, at 445.
19 Blackshaw, supra note 15, at 225.
20 Casini, supra note 8, at 446.
21 Id.
22 See id. at 450 (“The CAS, in fact, resembles a civil court when it deals with
commercial law cases (such as player transfers), an administrative court when it has to
decide claims against sporting institutions’ decisions, a constitutional court when it must
resolve conflicts between different institutions of the Olympic movement, and even a
criminal court when it has to balance evidence in doping violations.”).
23 CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION art. S2 (2017) (Eng.).
24 Casini, supra note 8, at 444.
25 See id.
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When handling appeals, the CAS seeks “to resolve through the
appeals arbitration procedure disputes concerning the decisions of
federations, associations or other sports-related bodies, insofar as
the statutes or regulations of the said sports-related bodies or a
specific agreement so provide.”26 Specifically, “[a]n appeal against
the decision of a federation, association or sports-related body may
be filed with CAS if the statutes . . . provide or if the parties have
concluded a specific arbitration agreement and if the Appellant has
exhausted the legal remedies available.”27
The CAS’s jurisdiction extends to disputes “involving national
federations, affiliated clubs and individual members that concern
private, nontechnical rules and statutes of the IFs [International
Federations].”28 Jurisdiction requires an arbitration agreement that
“represents the legal basis and legitimation for a CAS intervention”
and only with a valid arbitration clause can the CAS hear cases.29
Generally, municipal courts will “recognize and enforce CAS
awards, primarily under the New York Convention on Arbitral
Awards.”30 The New York Convention requires “national courts of
signatory countries to enforce valid arbitration awards if the parties
agreed in writing to arbitrate their dispute.”31 Because of the
promise of this uniform body for international sports, many
international federations amended their statutes to establish the CAS
as “the exclusive, final tribunal for appeal of decisions.”32 Today,
the CAS’s status as the “arbitral of last resort” assumes an
unprecedented capacity to compel all major federations to enforce
automatic appeals to its tribunal.33
Once a case is appealed, the CAS panel “has full power to
review the facts and the law,” deciding the case through the law
CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION art. S12(b) (2017) (Eng.).
Id. at R47.
28 James A. R. Nafziger, International Sports Law: A Replay of Characteristics and
Trends, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 489, 508 (1992).
29 Casini, supra note 8, at 459.
30 Id. (referring to the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards as the “New York Convention”).
31 MATHEW MITTEN et al., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 297 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 4th ed. 2016).
32 Nafziger, supra note 28, at 508.
33 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 17 (“The CAS has the task of
resolving legal disputes in the field of sport through arbitration. It does this pronouncing
arbitral awards that have the same enforceability as judgements of ordinary courts.”).
26
27
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chosen by the parties or “according to the law of the country in
which the federation, association or sports-related body . . . is
domiciled . . . [or] that the Panel deems appropriate.”34 These
arbitrations take the form of de novo review, and once concluded,
they extend binding and final opinions.35 The CAS’s decisions may
“replace[] the decision challenged or [may] annul the decision and
refer the case back to the previous instance.”36 The award issued by
the Court “shall be final and binding upon the parties . . . [and] [i]t
may not be challenged by way of an action.”37 CAS decisions can
only be challenged if the circumstances give rise to legitimate
doubts over the arbitrator’s independence or over his or her
impartiality.”38 These challenges are ultimately determined by the
ICAS Board.39
While the CAS’s decisions are binding, they do not hold
precedential value as “no panel is bound by preceding decisions
issued by other panels.”40 However, there is still extreme deference
given to the CAS’s previous decisions, and the CAS panels tend to
follow their past jurisprudence and possess persuasive authority.41
These decisions create a “judge-made sport law” that is often
referred to as lex sportiva and consists of decisions rendered by the
CAS that create a set of principles and rules specifically addressing
sport.42 The meaning of lex sportiva has extended over time to refer
more “generally to the transnational law produced by sporting

34 CODE OF S PORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION art. R57–58 (2017) (Eng.); See also
CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION art. R45 (2017) (Eng.) (“The Panel shall decide
the dispute according to the rules of law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a
choice, according to Swiss law.”).
35 DAVID MCARDLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPORT 48 (2018).
36 CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION art. R57 (2017) (Eng.).
37 Id. arts. R46, R59.
38 CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION art. R34 (2017) (Eng.).
39 Id.
40 Casini, supra note 8, at 457.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 441. See also Annie Bersagel, Is There a Stare Decisis Doctrine in the Court
of Arbitration for Sport? An Analysis of Published Awards for Anti-Doping Disputes in
Track and Field, 12 PEPPERDINE DISP. RESOL. L. J. 189, 206 (2012) (“At a minimum, the
CAS’s exclusive jurisdiction over disciplinary cases involving international-level Olympic
athletes, as well as the emergence of a body of CAS jurisprudence independent of national
legislation [lex sportiva], has already led to the emergence of a distinctively autonomous
system of global private regulation.”).
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institutions.”43 With the continuing growth of lex sportiva, the
“CAS is building up a discrete body of jurisprudence . . .
introducing a measure of legal certainty for the benefit of all those
in the worldwide sporting community, who rely on the intervention
of CAS in the settlement of their disputes.”44
III. Legal Analysis
The case at issue involves RFC Seraing, a Belgian football club,
and Doyen Sports, a private equity fund involved with the financial
management of football players and coaches, against the Fédération
International de Football Association (FIFA), the European
Football Union (UEFA), the Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de
Football Association (URBSFA – the governing body of football in
Belgium) – and the International Federation of Professional
Footballers (FIFPRO).45 The original dispute arose in 2015 when
“Doyen Sports Investments Ltd. signed an agreement with RFC
Seraing in which the club transferred the economic rights of three
players to the firm for a payment of 300,000 Euros . . . [to become]
the owner of 30 percent of the financial value stemming from the
players’ rights.”46 This transfer of rights violated FIFA’s third-party
ownership (TPO) ban, leading RFC Seraing & Doyen to challenge
the legality of FIFA’s ban on the basis of EU competition law in a
Belgian court.47 The purpose of FIFA’s ban on TPO was to prevent
third parties from having economic ownership rights over players,
thus interfering with FIFA’s larger economic control over its
players.48 FIFA then brought disciplinary proceedings against RFC
Seraing on the basis of this TPO contract, alleging a violation of
FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP),
while imposing a four-year transfer ban on RFC Seraing.49 RFC
Seraing and Doyen Sports appealed FIFA’s decision to the CAS,
who then applied the FIFA RSTP and Swiss law to determine that

Casini, supra note 8, at 442.
Blackshaw, supra note 15, at 245.
45 CA Bruxelles, 2016/AR/2048, Vaja 1227181, at 9 ¶ 9.
46 Zachary Zagger, Sport Court Denies Its Arbitration was Declared ‘Illegal,’
LAW360 (Sept. 11, 2018), https://lawlibproxy.ad.unc.edu:2147/articles/1081696/sportcourt-denies-its-arbitration-was-declared-illegal- [https://perma.cc/2V9L-6A7Y].
47 Mavromati, supra note 4.
48 Id.
49 Id. This decision was later confirmed by the FIFA Appeal Commission.
43
44
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FIFA’s sanctions were proportionate to the violation.50 RFC
Seraing and Doyen then subsequently filed an appeal before the
Brussels Court of Appeals, challenging the legitimacy of the CAS
as a true arbitral tribunal.51
On August 28, 2018, the Brussels Court of Appeals issued a
ruling that rejected FIFA’s arbitration clause requiring automatic
appeal to the CAS.52 RFC Seraing successfully argued both the
“generality” of the arbitration clause and the general prohibition on
state courts as illegal and contrary to public order.53 From the FIFA
Article of Agreement, any recourse to an ordinary court is
prohibited, except as specifically provided for in the FIFA
Regulations.54 Moreover, RFC Seraing connected the adverseness
to public policy with the requirements of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR).55 Specifically, Article 6.1 of the ECHR
entitles all individuals to “to a fair and public hearing . . . by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law,”56 under
which RFC Seraing believes the CAS does not qualify.
The Brussels Court of Appeals held that the arbitration clause
binding the parties to the appellate jurisdiction of the CAS is too
generic and contains no “defined legal relationship.”57 The clause
at issue (#59 Obligations relating to dispute resolution) reads:
The confederations, member associations and leagues shall agree
to recognise CAS as an independent judicial authority and to
ensure their members, affiliated players and officials comply with
the decisions passed by CAS. The same obligation shall apply to
intermediaries and licensed match agents; Recourse to ordinary
courts of law is prohibited unless specifically provided for in the
FIFA regulations. Recourse to ordinary courts of law for all types
of provisional measures is also prohibited; The associations shall
insert a clause in their statutes or regulations, stipulating that it is

Id.
51 Id.
52 Zagger, supra note 46.
53 CA Bruxelles, 2016/AR/2048, Vaja 1227181, at 9 ¶ 9.
54 Id. at 13 ¶ 14.
55 Id. at 9 ¶ 9.
56 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
57 CA Bruxelles, 2016/AR/2048, Vaja 1227181, at 13 ¶ 14 (referencing paragraph
31 of the Interlocutory Judgment & Articles 59, 66 of the FIFA Statutes).
50
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prohibited to take disputes in the association or disputes affecting
leagues, members of leagues, clubs, members of clubs, players,
officials and other association officials to ordinary courts of law,
unless the FIFA regulations or binding legal provisions
specifically provide for or stipulate recourse to ordinary courts of
law. Instead of recourse to ordinary courts of law, provision shall
be made for arbitration. Such disputes shall be taken to an
independent and duly constituted arbitration tribunal recognized
under the rules of the association or confederation or to CAS.58

58 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) Statutes, Regulations
Governing the Application of the Statutes: Standing Orders of the Congress, 47–49 ¶¶ 6668 (April 2015) (emphasis added) (stating the FIFA statutes in existence in 2015 when the
initial dispute was filed). The statutes of interest are reprinted below.
“#66 Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)
1. FIFA recognizes the independent Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) with
headquarters in Lausanne (Switzerland) to resolve disputes between FIFA, Members,
Confederations, Leagues, Leagues, Clubs, Players, Officials, Intermediaries and licensed
match agents.
2. The provisions of the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration shall apply to the
proceedings. CAS shall primarily apply the various regulations of FIFA and, additionally,
Swiss law.
#67 Jurisdiction of CAS:
1. Appeals against final decisions passed by FIFA’s legal bodies and against decisions
passed by Confederations, Members or Leagues shall be lodged with CAS within 21 days
of notification of the decision in question.
2. Recourse may only be made to CAS after all other internal channels have been
exhausted.
3. CAS, however, does not deal with appeals arising from:
a) Violations of the Laws of the Game;
b) Suspensions of up to four matches or up to three months (with the exception of doping
decisions);
c) Decisions against which an appeal to an independent and duly constituted arbitration
tribunal recognized under the rules of an Association or Confederation may be made.
4. The appeal shall not have a suspensive effect. The appropriate FIFA body or,
alternatively, CAS may order the appeal to have a suspensive effect.
5. FIFA is entitled to appeal to CAS directly against any internally final and binding
doping-related decision passed in particular by the Confederations, Members or Leagues
in accordance with the provisions set out in the FIFA Anti-Doping Regulations.
6. The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) is entitled to appeal to CAS against any
internally final and binding doping-related decision passed in particular by FIFA, the
Confederations, Members or Leagues in accordance with the provisions set out in the FIFA
Anti-Doping Regulations.
#68 Obligation:
1. The Confederations, Members and Leagues shall agree to recognise CAS as an
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The Brussels Court concluded that the will of the drafters cannot
apply because the arbitration clause is too general to be recognized
under Belgian law.59 This generality is illustrated by the clause’s
failure to mention a limited applicability to “sports disputes.”60
Rather, as a matter of Belgian law, the arbitration clause fails to
present a “specific legal relationship” that is necessary to constitute
a valid arbitration agreement.61 The Court of Appeals was set to
hear arguments on the broader issues of TPO rules, but no record
has been released on a judgment.62
In response to the Brussels Court’s ruling, ICAS commented
that most reports “do not properly reflect the reasons” of the Court
of Appeals; rather, the Court actually said the arbitration Clause
between FIFA and RFC Seraing lacked specificity because it did
not limit automatic arbitration to “sports-related” conflicts,
violative of Swiss law.63 ICAS characterized the Court’s holding as
independent judicial authority and to ensure that their members, affiliated Players and
Officials comply with the decisions passed by CAS. The same obligation shall apply to
intermediaries and licensed match agents.
2. Recourse to ordinary courts of law is prohibited unless specifically provided for in the
FIFA regulations. Recourse to ordinary courts of law for all types of provisional measures
is also prohibited.
3. The Associations shall insert a clause in their statutes or regulations, stipulating that it
is prohibited to take disputes in the Association or disputes affecting Leagues, members of
Leagues, Clubs, members of clubs, Players, Officials and other Association Officials to
ordinary courts of law, unless the FIFA regulations or binding legal provisions specifically
provide for or stipulate recourse to ordinary courts of law. Instead of recourse to ordinary
courts of law, provision shall be made for arbitration. Such disputes shall be taken to an
independent and duly constituted arbitration tribunal recognized under the rules of the
association or confederation or to CAS.
The Associations shall also ensure that this stipulation is implemented in the Association,
if necessary by imposing a binding obligation on its members. The Associations shall
impose sanctions on any party that fails to respect this obligation and ensure that any
appeal against such sanctions shall likewise be strictly submitted to arbitration, and not to
ordinary courts of law.” Id.
59 CA Bruxelles, 2016/AR/2048, Vaja 1227181, at 13 ¶ 14.
60 Id. at 14 ¶ 15.
61 Simon Grossobel, Brussel’s Court of Appeal Challenges CAS Jurisdiction Clause
in
FIFA
Statutes,
NAT’L
L.
REV.
(Sept.
17,
2018),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/brussel-s-court-appeal-challenges-casjurisdiction-clause-fifa-statutes [https://perma.cc/9E5Q-JE9G].
62 Id.
63 Media Release, Int’l Council of Arbitration for Sport ICAS/CAS, Statement of the
Int’l Council for Sport (ICAS) Regarding the Case RFC Seraing/Doyen
Sport/FIFA/UEFA/URBSF
(Sept.
11,
2018),
http://www.tas-
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narrower than the media’s interpretation, believing that its
generality was a drafting error that will “not affect the jurisdiction
of CAS globally.”64 However, it is undeniable that this case has
opened the door to broader questions about the CAS’s authority,
organization and effectiveness.
IV. Implications to the International Sports World
What does this ruling mean for the CAS? Will its institutional
legitimacy be questioned or its binding power on parties be diluted?
While the Brussels Court opinion can be interpreted as narrow in its
holding, it opens these questions up for discussion. As a result of
the ruling, domestic courts may now have the authority to hear
appeals in sporting disputes that were previously sent directly to the
CAS.65 This deterrence would strip the CAS’s autonomous control
over international sports conflicts, severely harming its authority, as
its power and legitimacy stems from its position as the sole
arbitration tribunal for sports conflicts. The implications of this
change will affect all national and international sports
organizations, most notably large football federations. Due to
football’s status as the world’s most popular and most lucrative
sport, the proper handling of large legal disputes is a central
concern.66
The biggest resulting change to the sports world will be in the
location of appeals and the law applied in such cases. Rather than

cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ICAS_statement_11.09.18.pdf [hereinafter ICAS Media
Release] [https://perma.cc/869T-BDTH].
64 Id. The ICAS believes that this case will not affect CAS internationally because
the ruling will simply require the drafting of more specific arbitration clauses. The ICAS
also addressed the connection between the present case and a 2016 case in the same court.
See Zagger, supra note 46 (“The Belgian court decision comes after the CAS faced serious
questions in a case involving German five-time Olympic gold medalist speed skater
Claudia Pechstein, who challenged a two-year suspension for irregular blood tests that she
said could be explained by an inherited blood condition. A German court ruled that the
CAS had not given Pechstein a fair hearing because the closed list of CAS arbitrators is
biased in favor of international sports governing bodies. But, ultimately, that decision was
reversed in favor of the CAS by the German Federal Court of Justice, the highest court for
civil appeals in Germany, which found she had voluntarily agreed to arbitration in the
CAS.”).
65 Diamond, supra note 3, ¶ 5.
66 Blackshaw, supra note 15, at 223 (“There is, therefore, a great deal at stake in sport
at the global and European levels—not only on but also, and perhaps more so, off the field
of play.”).
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the CAS reviewing cases and issuing rulings based on previously
agreed upon law or Swiss law, these cases may now be subject to
the laws of individual states.67
The interactions between
international and national regimes will become an important
component to consider as appeals bring greater attention and
consideration to the nature and global acceptance of the CAS.
Specifically, “[i]n spite of [the] success [of the transnational nature
of sports institutions], the existence of a lex sportiva is not
universally accepted, in so far as some domestic orders have
affirmed state law sovereignty over sport norms by contesting the
legal nature of these rules.”68 Players may start resorting to state
adjudication, rather than appealing to the CAS because it presents
them with a more neutral determining body.69
Additionally, the expansive power of large sports federations
makes it difficult for individual players and agencies to have equal
bargaining power.70 Rather, the current “[r]eliance on [tribunals]
may deter athletes from seeking alternative remedies such as
adjudication . . . and some of their decisions, particularly those
involving restraint-of-trade claims, may be unenforceable by
municipal courts.”71 As it stands now, there is no viable way for
players to improve their bargaining power. With the international
federations so closely integrated with the CAS, players are forced
to accept the proffered contracts without any alterations to the
arbitration clauses.72 The unequal bargaining power between
67 CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION art. R45 (2017) (Eng.) (“The Panel shall
decide the dispute according to the rules of law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of
such a choice, according to Swiss law. The parties may authorize the Panel to decide ex
aequo et bono.”).
68 Casini, supra note 8, at 442.
69 As later discussed in this Note, the interconnectedness of the CAS with large sports
federations inherently adds risks of coercion and bias into the appeal decisions of the CAS.
This partisan make-up is further enhanced by the unequal bargaining power between large
sports federations and individual players.
70 Id. at 461 n.80 (“Though it is doubtful that athletes are truly free to decide whether
to sign or not these ad hoc clauses embodied in sporting institutions’ statutes.”).
71 Nafziger, supra note 28, at 507.
72 See Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Are Discriminatory and Unfair, PUB. CITIZEN,
(last visited Aug. 20, 2019) https://www.citizen.org/article/mandatory-arbitration-clausesare-discriminatory-and-unfair/ [https://perma.cc/8DUY-NRXS] (“In addition to the denial
of consumers’ and employees’ rights to seek remedies in court, arbitration between two
parties with unequal bargaining power is too often a discriminatory and one-sided process,
benefitting the corporations mandating it.”).
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players and federations supports the idea that domestic courts might
be the only judicial body with the interests and protection of the
players in mind.73
This challenge to the CAS’s jurisdiction raises further questions
as to its legitimacy. While it “would be possible in theory that one
State imposes its own decisions during sports events held in its own
territory and against the will of the ‘authorité international
[International Federations or the CAS],’ that State would not be
allowed to host any international sport competition.”74
Additionally, the “main difficulty [of being subject to one State’s
law] is that one [court] may potentially end up with two
contradictory decisions: one issued by the Belgian courts,
enforceable in Belgium only, and the original one issued by the CAS
(and which was confirmed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal),
enforceable in the rest of the world.”75 This tension between
national and international law was seen during the 2006
jurisdictional challenge in UCI v. Landaluce and Real Federación
Española de Ciclismo.76 The case involved two cyclists that tested
positive for doping and who alleged that a Spanish law forbade
arbitration recourse in the context of doping infractions.77
The court remarked on this conflict of law by stressing that:
[s]tates and international sports federations are not rivals for
authority; on the contrary, their roles are complementary. States
are concerned only with the conduct of those who fall within the
reach of their laws, while international federations administer
competitions within the scope of their activity . . . National
sovereignty, as expressed in a sports disciplinary measure decided
by a national authority, is in principle and by its nature limited to
national territorial application. A national decision may,
however, be replaced by a decision of the international authority
Infra note 69.
Casini, supra note 8, at 463. It appears that ICAS would oppose any competitions
hosted by states that fail to provide the CAS with discretion and authority over sports
disputes.
75 ICAS Media Release, supra note 63.
76 World Anti-Doping Agency v. Federación Mexicana de Fútbol, CAS
2006/A/1149, 2007/A/1211, ¶¶ 30-31 (May 16, 2007) (quoting UCI v. Landaluce, TAS
2006/A/1119 (¶¶ 49–50, translated from French)).
77 Id.
73
74
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– CAS – in order to ensure the required uniform application of
law. True, it is theoretically conceivable that a state would impose
its national decisions with respect to international events taking
place on its territory even in disregard of the international
authority. Such an attitude would, however, contradict the effort
to fight doping on the international level, and could lead to the
exclusion of the concerned state from the organisation of
international competitions. It would be surprising for a state to
wish to adopt such a posture[.]78

Currently, the most appropriate location for international sports
disputes to be heard is thus unsettled and unknown. In support of
domestic courts hearing these cases is the increased protection
afforded to the players and private parties, further suggesting that
domestic courts may be better equipped to level–the rather unlevel–
playing field between large international sports federations and the
subservient players and agencies.79 Yet, UCI curbs this theory by
highlighting the contradictory nature of having domestic courts
fighting sports issues on an international level.80
Without a uniform ruling, every player and agency will be held
to different standards. In addition, states that refuse to accept the
jurisdiction of the CAS will not be seen as adequate locations for
hosting international sports competitions.81 While no major bodies
are currently challenging the authority of the CAS, it remains an
incipient issue that will eventually gain momentum and is ripe for
international reformation.
V. The CAS through the Lens of American Legal Tradition
In analyzing the CAS through the lens of American law, the
tribunal’s very nature seems suspect and counter to many

Id. ¶ 30 (emphasis added).
79 With “States [] concerned only with the conduct of those who fall within the reach
of their laws” they are not coerced by allegiances to sports federations and can thus better
protect the interests of the individual parties. See id.
80
See id. (“Such an attitude would, however, contradict the effort to fight doping on
the international level, and could lead to the exclusion of the concerned state from the
organisation of international competitions.”).
81 See id. (inferring that hosting international competitions would be difficult if there
is an “exclusion of the concerned state from the organisation of international
competitions”).
78
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fundamental legal traditions in America.82 These characteristics
further touch on weaknesses and problems inherent in the CAS’s
nature and in the tribunal’s relationships with dominant sports
organizations. The notable areas for concern include the CAS’s
tight integration with large sports federations and the Court’s lack
of impartiality and precedence.83
The organizational structure of the CAS inherently fosters an
inability of arbitrators to be neutral and impartial. The CAS “may
sometimes be [seen as] little more than executive panels in
disguise”84 composed of individuals from the very parties that
appeal to the tribunal. These executive panels, including the CAS
and ICAS, are often made of former athletes and former executives
from large international sports associations with mixed loyalties.85
Specifically, ICAS members are often chosen from International
Sports Federations, Association of Summer Olympic IFs,
Association of Winter Olympic IFs, Association of the National
Olympic Committees and the International Olympic Committee.86
82 See Jan Ginter Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: Some
Intersections Between Law and Political Science, YALE L. SCH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
REPOSITORY 169, 179 (1968) (discussing the “postulate that judicial decisions are
legitimate only when they rest on neutral principles from the duty of constitutional
adjudication that [legal scholar Professor Herbert Wechsler] finds article III to impose on
the courts”).
83 Daniel H. Yi, Turning Medals into Metal: Evaluating the Court of Arbitration for
Sport as an International Tribunal, YALE L. SCH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 1,
31-32 (“Prior to 1994, the IOC exercised direct oversight of the CAS. After the Paris
Agreement, however, ICAS was created to take on this duty. However, Olympic
institutions are still very much in the picture, retaining substantial influence over both the
ICAS appointment process. In fact, ICAS’ entire twenty-person roster is appointed either
directly or indirectly by Olympic institutions. Based on its membership requirements, there
are four ways that ICAS (and therefore the CAS) remains firmly entangled with Olympic
institutions. First, Olympic institutions directly appoint 60% (12 out of 20 total) of all CAS
governors. Second, the twelve ICAS members appointed by Olympic institutions have sole
discretion in appointing the remaining eight members. Third, up to sixteen members of
ICAS can, and mostly are, members of Olympics institutions. In fact, at last check, twelve
current members of ICAS are also high-ranking members of some Olympic institution.
Finally, there is no life tenure in ICAS; members are only guaranteed a four-year term. If
their appointing body (most likely, an Olympic institution) is not satisfied with their
performance after four years, Olympic bodies can simply refuse to re-appoint a recalcitrant
member. Assuming that the Paris Agreement was intended to truly emancipate CAS from
Olympic institutions, ICAS appears to be a feeble attempt to accomplish this goal.”).
84 Nafziger, supra note 28, at 506.
85 See CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION art. S4 (2017) (Eng.).
86 Id. art. S4 ¶¶ a-c.
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The tribunal is so heavily integrated with these federations
because the very members of the CAS are appointed by ICAS to
join the Court.87 “Section S6 of the CAS Code gives ICAS the
power to appoint CAS arbitrators, amend the CAS Code, and elect
the presidents of the Ordinary and Appeals Divisions of the CAS.
In essence, the ICAS has overwhelming influence over the
management, administration, and regulation of the CAS.”88 The
irony of this is that a driving reason for creating the CAS was to
have a court free from the powers of the international federations
and their influential nature.89 The prevalence of “enforced
arbitration” clauses and the interconnectedness of the sports world
illustrate how closely affiliated the CAS is with international sports
associations.
From an American legal system perspective, CAS is antithetical
to many of the system’s founding principles. Rather, CAS
possesses similar characteristics, including inequalities in
bargaining power through arbitration agreements, to that of private
organizations like the National Football League (NFL).90 The NFL
invokes a “collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the
NFL Player’s Association (NFLPA), the labor union representing
professional football players, and the owners of football teams.”91
The CBA parallels the CAS in two respects: (1) the inequality of
bargaining power between the CBA, the NFLPA, and the team
owners mirrors that of the CAS, team owners, and the (little
represented) players; and (2) the biased authority over appellate
hearings in the CBA with relation to their Commissioner and in the
CAS with relation to the intra-court selection for arbitrators that is
highly influenced by sports federations.92

Id. art. S14.
Melissa Hewitt, An Unbalanced Act: A Criticism of How the Court of Arbitration
for Sport Issues Unjustly Harsh Sanctions by Attempting to Regulate Doping in Sport, 22
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 769, 775 (2015) (emphasis added).
89 See Blackshaw, supra note 15, at 225.
90 Jennifer R. Bondulich, Rescuing the “Supreme Court” of Sports: Reforming The
Court of Arbitration for Sport Arbitration Member Selection Procedures, 42 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 275, 311-19 (2016).
91 Id. at 312.
92 See id. at 311-22 (“Similar to the binding arbitration clauses found in contracts
between athletes and their respective athletic federations, under the CBA, players are
bound to the arbitration procedures set forth and agreed to by the NFLPA and the owners
of the teams.”).
87
88
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The CBA provides the commissioner of the NFL with both
“discretionary and disciplinary power over conduct considered
‘detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of
professional football.’ Essentially a catch-all, the CBA gives the
commissioner the express authority to define the scope of
detrimental conduct and to impose discipline he deems fit.”93 Even
more alarming, the CBA allows for the Commissioner, with only
little oversight by the NFPLA, to “‘serve as [a] hearing officer in
any appeal under his discretion.’ The NFL commissioner thus has
exclusive authority to choose the arbitrators in the appeals process,
and may even select himself.”94 The Commissioner is provided with
“the power to be both judge and jury” with the ability to issue
binding decisions with little “neutral third-party oversight.”95 The
essence of this unchecked power and unequal bargaining is
alarming and presents high risks for “structural imbalance and bias”
in both the NFL and the CAS.96
The structural imbalance can clearly be seen in this break-down:
There are 193 governments that have delegated the CAS to
adjudicate sports disputes on their behalf, which means that the
power of lex sportive is currently in the hands of 330 individuals.
The interests of tens of thousands of athletes are at stake, yet
power is centralized in the hands of the few. When it comes to
fairness, there is a great cost to athletes subject to the CAS’s
jurisdiction because the CAS will inevitably “disagree with, rule
against, or render interpretations that run counter to what [national
governments] might have wanted, and what the democratic
majority might prefer.” The CAS has a monopoly over the
international sports arena, and it is subject to the minimalist of
review standards.97
Id. at 313.
Id. at 313-14 (“Although this power was collectively bargained for by the NFL
and the NFLPA, it is drastically different than typical arbitration clauses, in which ‘a
neutral third-party arbiter is appointed by both parties to make a binding decision with-out
preferential treatment to one side.’”).
95 Id. at 314.
96 Bondulich, supra note 90, at 319 (discussing the inability for “the president of the
[Appeals Arbitration] [D]ivision, who is selected by ICAS through individual institutions
and the IOC [to] be able to select an unbiased arbitrator”).
97 Hewitt, supra note 88, at 780-81.
93
94
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As previously established in this paper, sports are immensely
important in our society. They present a platform that intermixes
extreme financial power and influence with a massive public
following. A structural imbalance at the top level, directly affecting
the individuals that generate a collective following in the public, is
an important issue that the Belgian Court of Appeals ruling brings
to light.
The structural imbalance of the CAS is further exploited by the
court’s power, amidst its partisan make-up, to issue advisory
opinions “on juridical matters concerning sport” that directly shape
sports internationally with the “minimalist of review standards.”98
Specifically, the CAS can “provide for summary conciliation . . .
[and] advise international federations and other sports organizations
on problems related to their structures and procedures.”99
Ultimately, “[t]he competence of the CAS to give advisory
opinions, in particular, suggests a fertile source of international
sports law . . . so as to render its prescriptions and sanctions
‘justified’ [and] more proportional, in the eyes of national
judges.”100 But, the CAS’s authorization to issue advisory opinions
is more evidence of the CAS’s close affiliation with international
federations.
How can the CAS make objective and unbiased decisions on
sports conflicts when its operations are interdependent to those of
the international sports organizations? This very practice runs
against the United States practice of forbidding federal courts from
issuing advisory opinions because it blurs the line of separation of
powers.101 The insular nature of the CAS becomes tainted when it
so closely associates itself with the same parties that bring it
appeals. The result of these relationships is clearly seen through the
CAS’s acceptance of FIFA’s sanctions as proportionate to RFC
Seraing’s violation, without any consideration to the suitability of

See id; Nafziger, supra note 28, at 507.
Id.
100 Id. at 508.
101 Phillip M. Kannan, Advisory Opinions By Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV.
769, 769 (referring to Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution in which the
“affirmative grant of authority to federal courts . . . to hear and decide cases or
controversies has been interpreted to prohibit these courts from giving advisory
opinions.”).
98
99
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the enforced arbitration clause.102
While international law inherently provides for a different
nature than that of American law, it is also important to compare the
institutional safe-holds that are present and absent in both systems.
The CAS tribunal is not bound by precedent and has the freedom to
review every case de novo, even with possible disregard to the
decisions of arbitral tribunals below it.103 This absence of binding
precedent seems inherently suspect and questions how much trust
can be placed in the Court’s constructed lex sportiva. Additionally,
it highlights the absence of checks on the Court’s power. As the
CAS operates through arbitration requirements forcing appeals to
their tribunals, the Court has the ability to supersede national court
systems and other State law when coming to its binding
conclusions.104 The unlimited power of the CAS is further enhanced
by the high stakes of their decisions, as the Court has the sole ability
to uniformly alter sport internationally.105
While the uniform and insular nature of the CAS positively
contributes to the international sports world, it is concerning that the
Court’s power can continue to grow freely and endlessly. With
concerns for the neutrality of the tribunal amidst minimal checks on
its power, the growing power of the CAS raises concerns such as:
further disadvantages for players without improvements to their
bargaining power; further opportunities for the CAS’s “few” to
issue policy decisions that directly impact players and their
respective agents, coaches, and federations; and further chances for
the “few” to risk the integrity of the very sports that are enjoyed
internationally for biased gain. By reorganizing the selection
process for the CAS, some oversight will be added to the tribunal to
assure minimal checks to its authority.
VI. Recommendations
The Brussels Court of Appeals decision is a small flicker of

See Mavromati, supra note 4, at 3.
MCARDLE, supra note 35, at 48.
104 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 17 (“An award pronounced by the CAS
is final and binding on the parties from the moment it is communicated. It may in particular
be enforced in accordance with the New York Convention on the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards, which more than 125 countries have signed.“).
105 See id. (possessing the ability to issue “final and binding” judgments provides CAS
with the power and influence to single-handedly shape sports across the world).
102
103
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resistance to the CAS that will likely die out before any real
movement is initiated. While there are fundamental characteristics
of the CAS that are worrisome, specifically in its close relationship
to authoritative sports associations and its lack of binding precedent,
the CAS is likely to remain unchanged as its existence is too highly
valued in international sports.
The CAS’s position as the sole arbitral body with internationally
respected decisions is too advantageous to completely reform.
Instead, minor reforms to protect its objectivity must be
implemented to constrain the influence of international sports
federations. An unbiased and uninfluenced panel can be achieved
through changes in the selection process for the CAS panels.
Instead of having ICAS – oftentimes itself made of IF officers –
directly selecting the CAS arbitrators, there should be an external
selection process. This process will balance a candidate’s former
arbitration experience with his or her knowledge of sport more
objectively than the ICAS.
Secondly, the arbitration clauses for all major sports federations
should be reviewed by the CAS to help the clauses better reflect an
equal bargaining power between players, third parties, and
international federations. Additionally, both a heavier involvement
of the players in making these recommendations to the sports
federations and an educational program to teach players what they
ascribe to when signing agreements are needed. Unequal
bargaining power is the natural result of a financially equipped and
experienced sports federation on the one side, with a player that
likely lacks the expertise to comprehend the complexity of these
agreements on the other side. Educational programs provided by
the CAS to the sports federation players will help to eliminate the
unequal bargaining power that exploits players.
VII. Conclusion
The CAS will continue to grow in power and influence until
institutional safe-holds are put in place to restrict its power. It is
important to retain a uniform ruling body that employs decisions
collectively followed by all national and international sports
federations; the CAS’s existence is necessary to assure that sports
retain their integrity and legitimacy in pursuit of honest play. But
the importance of the CAS does not rid it of the necessity for
institutional safe-holds that check its power and neutrality.
Unfortunately, with the current nature of the tribunal, this
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continuously-growing power represents the subsequently growing
power of the federations, the very problem that spurred the creation
of the CAS. With a more objective look into its operations and with
a mission focused on positive reform, the CAS may actually stay
within the sidelines of its originally-bound field.

